

From General to Particular The Game Metaphor in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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The game metaphor in Wittgenstein's philosophy suffers a fate we might expect given the philosopher's aphoristic style. Wittgenstein expressed his ideas in chains of remarks for which he said in the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations*; "The essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks."¹ Those who try to understand Wittgenstein and his philosophy of language are drawn to easy characterizations that emerge from his aphorisms and analogies. These surface examinations present Wittgenstein's remarks as anything but a natural progression. Such easy representation of the author's ideas might be accurate, and certainly would be more palatable, but in some cases, readers can quickly draw inaccurate conclusions. After all, the ideas that had been worked and reworked into short remarks were not apt for further encapsulation. They were as concise as they could be, pressed into form

by a master of the aphoristic style. So Wittgenstein's philosophical style leads some readers to view his work in snapshots, in isolated sections, one group of ideas breaking into the next.²

The game analogy is a prime example of an approach developed through aphorisms and often read in isolation from Wittgenstein's other ideas. All of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, that is, the volumes authored after his *Philosophical Remarks*, has been associated with the game metaphor. On the other hand, his early work, especially the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*,³ has been associated with the calculus approach to language. Analyses of the most famous periods in the philosopher's career lead some commentators to the conclusion that Wittgenstein had abandoned one approach for the other.⁴ This *overcharacterization* of Wittgenstein's philosophy threatens a sound understanding of the game metaphor.

The TLP is concerned with the system that belies the expression of thought in language, and in the later philosophy, language games are indeed the essential units of understanding.⁵ Wittgenstein's philosophy of language changed a great deal over his career. His approach to language in the early period was crucially different from his approach in the later period. But the fundamental change, I submit, is from a general to a particular description of the function of language, and not from the calculus approach to the game metaphor.

His work should be examined for its development, not for its lack of continuity. The temptation to characterize Wittgenstein's philosophy according to the analogies and metaphors used must be avoided where it obscures the view of language he conceived. More to the point: the game metaphor in Wittgenstein's philosophy served a specific purpose as an object of comparison. Without proper interpretation, the metaphor's purpose can be overestimated and lead us to the conclusion that language games superseded or replaced the older view that language functioned as a living system.

My project in this paper is twofold. First, I will show why and how Wittgenstein used the game analogy to articulate his view of language. Language games stand as the perfect metaphor for Wittgenstein, given his developing understanding of the way language worked. Of course, this is why his philosophy in the later period is so easily associated with the metaphor. Wittgenstein used games as the object of comparison in his analogy because they allowed him to express a variety of points the calculus model is not equipped to express.

Second, having established the purpose of the metaphor, I will argue that the calculus approach to language was not abandoned in favor of, but developed into an approach demonstrated through, simplified language games. In the later period, the calculus model became a description of how particular uses of language performed in particular circumstances, not a general theory of the way that language worked. I will argue that Wittgenstein articulated the calculus model in his later philosophy as a description of particular aspects and cases of language.

This discussion can conclude, then, where it began: with the assertion that Wittgenstein's use of aphorism and metaphor in concise remarks might lead some philosophers to the conclusion that we must examine two fundamentally different proposals — two different philosophies. My detailed examination of the purpose of the metaphor will allow an understanding of the development, rather than the multiplicity of Wittgenstein's philosophy. I will begin with a description of some of the problems in the early approach that generated the game analogy.

AWAY FROM THE GENERAL APPROACH

Wittgenstein wrote in his first book: "The truth of the thoughts here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems."⁶

The importance of the philosophy presented in this book should not be underestimated. The TLP attained its influential position in philosophy because it

presented a very attractive picture of the way language worked. Two features of that picture are crucial to this discussion: the TLP made sense of the system according to which language functions, and it provided an account of the way that language refers to, or is in some way *about* the world. On the systematic feature of language, Wittgenstein observed: "A proposition constructs a world with the help of logical scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands if it is true."⁷ On the way that language refers to the world, he wrote: "In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of objects"⁸ and, "That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it."⁹

The TLP picture of language was attractive, but it was also inadequate. In the post-TLP period of his philosophy, Wittgenstein saw that the two features mentioned above had been exaggerated in his initial discussion of language.

One difficulty with the early approach is the way that Wittgenstein conceived of the rules that frame language. The logical scaffolding that the calculus proposal was supposed to accentuate, when drawn to its proper conclusion, proved incomplete. The kind of rules postulated in the TLP were concrete in application. They were logical rules, and did not permit variation according to subject matter. These rules then required that the elements supplied to them be logically independent of one another. In "Some Remarks on Logical Form", an early example of post-Tractarian thought, Wittgenstein shows how logical independence of elementary units as a general characteristic of language is not possible. Statements of degree and number, for example, do not permit such an analysis. The logic of language, as supplied in the early philosophy, does not apply to all of language, *to language in general*: the TLP proposal is not equipped to deal with the structure of some expressions in language.

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein presents two sets of numbers in an example:

1	2	3	4
1	4	9	16

The second row of numbers is a function of the first set, namely the squaring function.¹⁰ But this example serves to show that for any two sets of arguments, the function performed on the first set to arrive at the second is ambiguous. Wittgenstein later wrote on rules, "For just where one says 'But don't you see...?' the rule is no use, it is what is explained, not what does the explaining."¹¹ And returning to the BB example: "What I wrote is in accordance with the rule of squaring; but it obviously is also in accordance with any number of other rules; and

amongst these it is not more in accordance with one than another." Although the squaring function is the obvious example of a function used to derive the second set of numbers, any other appropriate function serves just as well. Thus, a second flaw in the argument that language is a system built onto concrete rules of logic — general rules are subject to various interpretations; thus, such rules could not be the basis for a comprehensive account of the way that language functions. Although Wittgenstein could be sure that in some sense language operated according to rules, in investigating the nature of language, he could not lay the foundation for his philosophy on general rules.

There were other problems with the early philosophy. According to the calculus model of language articulated in the TLP, words are primarily connected with their meanings is by ostensive definition.¹² Ostensive definition is the method by which the referent of a word is obviously or directly demonstrated. In the TLP, the relationship is clear; "A name means an object. The object is its meaning," and, "In a proposition a name is a representative of an object."¹³ Ostensive definition, the basis for the name-object relation, applies in many cases, especially for proper names and names of physical objects. But the relation certainly does not apply in all linguistic situations. Early in PI, Wittgenstein writes of St. Augustine's association between ostensive definition and meaning: "Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication, only not everything that we call language is this system."¹⁴

In remark twenty-seven of PI, Wittgenstein cites a number of expressions for which there could be no ostensive definition. While we might be inclined to approach these as cases on the periphery of language, consideration of them is vital, Wittgenstein suggests, for an understanding of the nature of language.¹⁵ It is not the possibility that ostensive definition correlates language with the world *at all* that is attacked here, but again, the application of a principle that explains how language works in particular cases to language in general. On the appropriate use of ostensive definition to explain particular uses, we again examine the BB: "Such an explanation might consist of ostensive definitions. We should say; e.g., "this is Kings College" (pointing to the building), "this is a fire" (pointing to a fire). This shows you the way in which words and things *may* be connected."¹⁶

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So far we have examined two cases where Wittgenstein took issue not with the features of his early philosophy, but with how far he went in advocating those features as a general account of the structure of language. In the second section of this paper, I will show how both of these features, the system according to which language functions and the way that some units of language refer to the world, are made congruent with the game metaphor. The issues discussed above only infect the theory when taken as a general account of language. The problem I will examine now, however, was not so easy for Wittgenstein to reconcile.

To make sense of the connection between a word and its ostensive definition, using the TLP approach, we must postulate private mental experience. Private experience, we might say, falls out of the calculus proposal.¹⁷ Wittgenstein explains:

Thus, if you are asked what is the relation between a name and the thing it names, you will be inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and perhaps when you say this you think in particular of the mechanism of association.¹⁸

Wittgenstein's proposal in the TLP was supposed to stand, I have argued, as a general account of the function of language. Early in the BB, however, the philosopher investigated the idea that language was not equipped to refer to some aspects of the mind-world relationship. In a noteworthy passage, Wittgenstein draws the reader through an examination of a group of assertions made by a Diviner to describe his unusual sensations.

Wittgenstein's Diviner says: "I have never learnt to correlate depth of water with feelings in my hand, but when I have a certain feeling of tension in my hands, the words 'three feet' spring up in my mind."¹⁹ This example shows that although the grammar of the words in the Diviner's expression subscribe to appropriate rules for their use, they are combined in a way that we do not understand. The Diviner's expressions are not able to describe to the listener the sensations that they purport to describe.

This example presents a problem for Wittgenstein's early approach because it suggests that part of an investigation of the nature of language might require postulation of mental phenomena which cannot be evaluated sensibly. On the mental images we are inclined to postulate to explain the live character of signs in language, Wittgenstein writes:

As soon as you think of replacing the image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to the sentence at all.²⁰

The way we conventionally locate and describe pain is problematic for the same reason as the Diviner passage. Pain is used in explication because it is a clear case, we are led to think, of private sensation. The meaning of the word "pain" is supposed to refer directly to the sensation. It cannot be social behavior that connects "pain" to pain, for one who experiences pain might not express it, and one who claims to be in pain might be deceptive. Furthermore, what "pain" refers to is not a *synonym* for the expression the sensation, it is the expression of the sensation.²¹ Likewise, "pain" cannot be correlated with pain in a learned relationship; to have pains is not to have learned of pains, but to *have* them.²²

If we cannot identify a relation between the word "pain" and its sensation, we might want to know whether we can call the experience private at all. Subsequently, Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of privacy — a sensation is private if either only I can know about it or if others cannot feel it.²³

On the former sense of privacy, Wittgenstein develops a damaging criticism. To say that I can know of my own pains is really to say no more than that I am in pain. As noted, experience of pain can be kept a secret, but of course, the issue concerns the privacy of experiences which are not kept a secret.²⁴ There are no criteria of the evaluation of a sensation expression, so any such expression is empty. Wittgenstein sums this point up in: "The proposition 'sensations are private' is comparable to: 'one plays patience by oneself.'"²⁵

On the latter sense of privacy, pain cannot be reliably associated with pain behavior.²⁶ But Wittgenstein continues with the criticism of private sensations, suggesting that it is conceivable one could experience another's pain:

If, on the other hand, the tactual and kinaesthetic sensations described were correlated to the visual experience of seeing my hand touch the tooth of another person, there is no doubt that I would call this experience 'toothache in another person's tooth.'²⁷

Similarly: "In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain."²⁸ From the inadequacy of private sensations as a description of the nature of meaning, we can now see the fundamental aspect of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Since we cannot define criteria for the proper and improper application of signs to refer to private sensations, we cannot presume the correlation between words and meanings to be ostensive definitions associated with private experiences. From the famous section of PI:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people have *this* or something else. The assumption would thus be possible — though unverifiable — that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.²⁹

Stepping back, we can see the developed attack on this aspect of the calculus approach. Since there are expressions which we cannot understand through the general account of language presented in the TLP, and since many of these expressions refer to supposed private sensations like pain, we might insist that there is a fundamental problem with any explanatory apparatus which invokes private sensations as a feature. Since the calculus approach requires private sensations as the primary correlate of ostensive definition in the relationship between language and the world, we can assume that the Tractarian account, at least in regard to its proposal for connecting language to the world, is mistaken about private sensations. The calculus approach to language may prove coherent where it makes sense of the systematic and the referential features of particular uses of language. Private mental experience, however, proves incoherent, and so must be abandoned as the basis for an understanding of how language functions. Meaning, then, must be public phenomena.

Using the Game Metaphor

The game analogy allowed Wittgenstein to articulate the essential features of his developed account of the nature of language. A prominent characteristic of the later philosophy was the way that meaning emerges from language, that is, the way that signs get their life. In the later philosophy, meaning is derived

from the use of the particular expression — the *procedure* for using the expression. In the TLP, the initial connection between sign and meaning is described as use:³⁰ “In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense.”³¹ The TLP presents use as an expression to render a picture of reality within the logical syntax. But the use of other expressions (especially those cited in PI *rm.* 23 and 27) remains unexplained. In the BB Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of an expression, of any expression, derives from its use in language: “The use of a word in practice is its meaning,” and, “The meaning of a phrase for us is the use we make of it.”³² This is part of why the metaphor is a useful tool for Wittgenstein — the way meaning emerges from language is the way that particular games emerge from individuals’ participation in them. Meaning is use in the same way that individuals play games. An excerpt from the later period makes the point explicit: “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be a master of a technique.”³³

We established that Wittgenstein was forced to reject the idea that meaning was in any way a private phenomena. So another aspect of Wittgenstein’s approach, articulated in the game metaphor, is that we play games with each other. Expressions have meaning in language because individuals participate in the activity, and because the activity takes place within communities of use. If the life of a sign in language is not derived from the individual’s use of it, then there must be a basis for the assertion that the sign has a life outside its signification. The basis is the notion that language games *are* a form of life. Henry Finch puts the issue in precise terms: “A form of life is a possibility of meaningful action shared by members of a group, and hence repeatable by different members of the group on different occasions.”³⁴ Thus, the move from a general approach to particular uses of language within linguistic communities.

A third characteristic of language articulated in the game metaphor

further refines the adherence to a particular approach to language. The multiplicity of uses of language are illustrated by language games. Each game concerns the particular use it describes. Wittgenstein notes the tendency to search for a general explanation: “The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language.”³⁵ This tendency must be avoided, Wittgenstein thinks, because language games “form a *family* the members of which all have family likenesses,”³⁶ and, “there is no single feature in common to all of them, though there are many common features overlapping. They have family likenesses which are not clearly defined.”³⁷ Linguistic expressions can be defined, but not within a general theory of the nature of language. They can be defined, however, by their place in the context of the language game to which they belong. With some idea of Wittgenstein’s use of the game analogy at hand, we can examine how his strategy accounts for the concepts in the calculus approach as they were discussed earlier in this paper.

The first of those concepts was the set of general rules of language favoured in the TLP. As his view developed, Wittgenstein wrote: “For remember that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules.”³⁸ On precise rules for the use of language, Wittgenstein continued the explanation: “To suppose that there *must* be [precise rules] would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.”³⁹ The rules that hold language together cannot be determined through a general approach to language. What we call a rule in a language game might have very different roles in particular games.⁴⁰ Only in particular cases, with reference to particular language games, can one determine the proper and improper use of linguistic rules.

In the final piece of Wittgenstein’s *nachlaß*, we see how the philosopher’s notion of language games is equipped to dissolve philosophical disputes. If the relationship between particular language games can be determined, then the confusion resulting from their conflation can be avoided. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein investigated the position of certainty as the foundation of the language game. Both certainty and doubt stand outside the game, doubt threatening everything within, certainty supporting everything within.⁴¹ What stands fast for us is the basis for language games, according to OC, and as such is not subject to skepticism: “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.”⁴² Doubting propositions for which we can be certain on an everyday level, is conflating language games. Doubt might belong to the language game in which I could question whether it will rain

tomorrow or not. It does not, however, belong to the game in which I state that I am certain of my own existence. Conflating language games in this manner leads to philosophical puzzlement. If we understand that our interpretation of language must subscribe to rules determined by particular uses, we can avoid the pitfalls our ordinary use of language imposes on us. The rules of language do not apply in general, but within specific language games.

Returning to the problems created by the calculus approach, the place of ostensive definition in simple language games needs to be explained. The metaphor is constructed with reference to artificial examples of primitive games. In both PI and the BB Wittgenstein examines example cases of primitive languages which show how ostensive definition serves as the model for particular examples of language games.⁴³ Indeed, part of the concept of language games is precisely the fact that primitive games serve as the basis for more complex forms of expression.⁴⁴ In BB Wittgenstein writes: "We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms."⁴⁵

In the later philosophy, ostensive definition of words is situated as the correlation between words and their referents, according to the procedure for using the words in particular language games. These are the most straightforward of language games, upon which more complex forms of language are built. They are, as Wittgenstein says, the most primitive of games, and it is no surprise that they should be overestimated in an examination of the nature of language.

So, can simple language games help the philosopher make sense of expressions for sensations like pain? Like other units of language, sensation language takes its place as a language game. When we refer to pain, we do not refer to an ostensively defined private experience as the calculus approach would entail. Pain takes a place in a language game because within the rules of the game we are free to assume, by the use of pain expressions, that the expression of pain and the behavior of the suffering individual indicate that the individual is indeed in pain. Wittgenstein makes the point in an analogy: "If water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the pictured pot?"⁴⁶ Anthony Kenny explains the analogy: "In the metaphor, the water is the pain, the steam is the pain behavior, the pot is the sufferer's body. In the language game with pain there are pictures only of the sufferer and his behavior, not of his pain."⁴⁷

Sensation language, functions according to the use of particular expressions in the language game, and the sensations of pain themselves are excluded from the game. Hence, the departure from the implications of the calculus model of sensation language. We express and understand others' expressions of pain not through universal psychology, but through convention and community agreement of what is and is not appropriate within the language game. Thus the move from a general to a particular approach to language in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

From General to Particular

It has become fairly commonplace to interpret Wittgenstein's philosophy in terms of the abandonment of the calculus approach, and the emergence of the language game model.⁴⁸

This characterization, I submit, is a misinterpretation of his purpose in his later philosophy.

Some argue that although Wittgenstein came to favour one term over the other to describe his proposal, he used "calculus" in a way that did not require a general interpretation of the term.⁴⁹ The inclusion of particular cases among calculi was discussed by Wittgenstein in the post-Tractarian period:

The word 'calculus' has different meanings: there are different kinds of calculi just as there are different lists of rules. By this I do not mean different calculations, but different *kinds* of calculi. The concept calculus itself is ambiguous.⁵⁰

Wittgenstein here is broadening his notion of calculus so that it could conceivably apply in different circumstances, for particular purposes.

Stephen Hilmy has gone as far as to argue that Wittgenstein used the terms "calculus" and "language game" interchangeably, both in his published material and in rough notebooks where he often crossed out one expression to substitute the other.⁵¹ In Hilmy's view, this shows that there is some point to the idea that Wittgenstein did not abandon one approach for the other.

But there are more convincing arguments. There are significant lines of distinction between the early and later proposals; indeed, this paper has been partially dedicated to the discussion of these differences. The fact that Wittgenstein put forward two different proposals is indisputable. This is how

we came to debate the question of continuity in his philosophy. However, the features of the view of language retained in the later philosophy show the fundamental move — or at least the best way to observe that move — was not from a calculus approach to a language game model, but from a general to a particular examination of language.

The conception of rules presented in the TLP was not abandoned wholesale, but was re-evaluated and made to work within a different comprehensive account. In the later philosophy, instead of general rules of logic providing a foundation for all of language, rules function within particular manifestations of language games. Wittgenstein's comments regarding all language games explain equally well the kinds of rules within them: "I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, but that they are related to one another in many ways."⁵² But the *kind* of rules presented in the early and late periods share two determining characteristics. They are normative rules; they prescribe the behavior to which language users should adhere. Also, they provide the structure which determines the system which makes up language. The above passage shows that the system in the later proposal was developed according to particular uses of language, not according to language in general.

The Tractarian notion of ostensive definition was maintained in a similar manner. While the TLP account required ostensive definition as the primary correlation between sign and meaning *for all of the signs in language*, the later proposal allowed direct demonstration of reference, only according to use, and only when the correlation was straightforward.⁵³ Continuing, we see how Wittgenstein conceived of the system of language constructed on the foundation of the primitive, 'clear cut', and particular ostensive language games:

On the other hand we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.⁵⁴

For some language games, but not all, the ostensive correlation between language and the world is appropriate.

The tendency to ascribe general explanations where there are only particular features is termed by Wittgenstein "our craving for generality." Among the reasons for this craving is the propensity to look for something in common to all the entities we commonly include under a general term. This is precisely the mistaken approach to language the game analogy was intended to shake loose. The notion that the meaning of a word is something accumulated by one who understands the word furthers this mistaken approach. This inclination is associated with the idea that all of language works the same way proper names do — through ostensive definitions. Wittgenstein identifies a third rea-

In saying

"Don't think, just look!",

Wittgenstein is referring to an approach to language and to an approach to

his language -- and to his philosophy.

son for the craving for generality: "Again, the idea we have of what happens when we get hold of the general idea...is connected with the confusion between a mental state, meaning a state of a hypothetical mental mechanism."⁵⁵ So the private mental experiences which are presumed by the calculus approach stem from the general approach. Since general interpretation requires postulation of an indeterminate 'hypothetical mental mechanism,' only the particular uses of sensation language can be properly interpreted.

In the BB Wittgenstein wrote: "The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation."⁵⁶ This, I think, provides an understanding of the purpose of the game metaphor — to shake away the problems created by our craving for generality. The crucial shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy is from a general to a particular view of language. Anthony Kenny's words about language games are most accurate: "Whether they can still be called calculuses is indifferent, as long as we do not allow ourselves to be diverted by the use of a general term from the investigation of every individual case we want to decide."⁵⁷

The TLP system was not equipped to express all that Wittgenstein had observed as essential characteristics of language. The point of the later philosophy, and especially of the game metaphor, was that language was not all and only a rule governed calculus. Language games accentuated the role that the early approach played in the function of language.⁵⁸

So I return to the assertion made at the beginning of this discussion; that Wittgenstein's use of aphorism and metaphor might lead some to the conclusion that we must examine two different philosophies. Three remarks will serve as examples. In the TLP, Wittgenstein wrote: "In logic there can be no distinction between the general and the specific."⁵⁹ We can take from this

comment that during the early period, Wittgenstein conceived of language as a system in which all expressions could be derived from elementary expressions through the same operation.⁶⁰ As his conception changed, the philosopher wrote in the BB: "Instead of 'craving for generality' I could also have said 'the contempt for the particular case.'⁶¹ Here we have a statement of the early view, and a statement of the transitional period.

And finally, in PI, the most comprehensive account available of Wittgenstein's developed philosophy of language, we see the completed transition. In opposition to the first comment we read: "For if you look at them you will not see anything that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!"⁶² Who could examine these remarks and aphorisms and not be drawn to associate them with their distinguishing features?

The temptation to characterize Wittgenstein's philosophy according to the aphorisms derived from his style is powerful, but must be avoided where it obscures the approach to language he developed. The game metaphor served a specific purpose in Wittgenstein's philosophy as an object of comparison — as a way of looking at language. The analogy allowed him to describe the implications of his early view that drew him toward a different perspective, and most importantly, it allowed him to articulate the features of his new philosophy. This is where the later approach connects with his style in writing philosophy. In saying "Don't think, just look!", Wittgenstein is referring to an approach to language and to an approach to *his* language — and to his *philosophy*. Overcharacterization of Wittgenstein's game metaphor steps into the very trap — the craving for generality — that the later period in his philosophy was conceived to avoid.

Notes

1. Hereafter PI.
2. Avrum Stroll, *Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty* (Oxford Press, 1994) 80, 89.
3. Hereafter TLP.
4. Including myself in an earlier, unpublished, paper entitled "The Question of Continuity: The Picture Theory in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" (Apr. 1997) where I argued for a different conclusion than this paper with regard to the picture theory.
5. Henry Finch, *Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy* (Humanities Press, 1977) 74.
6. Wittgenstein, TLP (Routledge Press, 1921) Pref.
7. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 4.023.
8. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 2.131.
9. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 2.1511.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Harper Torchbooks, 1958) 13. Hereafter BB.
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel* (Basil Blackwell, 1967) rm 302.

12. Kenny, *Wittgenstein* pg 154, 156.
13. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 3.203 and 3.22, respectively.
14. Wittgenstein, PI (Macmillan Publishing, 1953) rm 3.
15. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 154.
16. Wittgenstein, BB 37. (my italics)
17. Finch, *Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy*, 11.
18. Wittgenstein, BB 3.
19. Wittgenstein, BB 10.
20. Wittgenstein, BB 5.
21. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 184.
22. Wittgenstein, PI rm 246.
23. Wittgenstein, PI rm 246, 247.
24. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 190.
25. Wittgenstein, PI rm 248.
26. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 184.
27. Wittgenstein, BB 53.
28. Wittgenstein, PI rm 253.
29. Wittgenstein, PI rm 272.
30. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 159.
31. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 3.326.
32. Wittgenstein, BB 69, 65 respectively.
33. Wittgenstein, PI rm 199.
34. Finch, 91.
35. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
36. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
37. Wittgenstein, BB 20.
38. Wittgenstein, BB 25.
39. Wittgenstein, BB 25.
40. Kenny, *Wittgenstein* 171.
41. Stroll, *Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty*, 140.
42. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* (Basil Blackwell, 1969) rm 205. Hereafter OC
43. Rm 2, and pg 3, respectively. Also, rm 10, 11 in the *Brown Book*.
44. Finch, *Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy* 69.
45. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
46. Wittgenstein, PI rm 297.
47. Kenny, *Wittgenstein* 198.
48. Hilmy, *The Later Wittgenstein*, 98.
49. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, 162.
50. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle - Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann* (Blackwell, 1979) 202.

51. Hilmy, 98; 100; 102.
52. Wittgenstein, PI rm 65.
53. In BB Wittgenstein wrote: "We see activities, reactions, which are clear cut and transparent." Wittgenstein, BB 17.
54. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
55. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
56. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
57. Kenny, *Wittgenstein* 162.
58. *jibe*
59. Wittgenstein, TLP rm 5.454.
60. Mounce, H.O. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction* (Blackwell, 1981) 65.
61. Wittgenstein, BB 18.
62. Wittgenstein, PI rm 66.

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