


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KINGDOMS OF VIRTUOUS PIXIES

An Interpretive Debate Between Aristotle and Kant

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Imagine, if you will, a university auditorium, a mediator (no pun intended), and two renowned speakers in the field of ethics. The structure of the discussion is based on these two scholars' interpretations of the lyrics of a contemporary song in the attempt to compare and differentiate their groundbreaking epistemologies and ethical theories. The following is a possible transcript of this academic discussion, for which we could gather to gain a more applicable version of their respective theories. This would be an excellent forum in which students could explore introductions to a wide range of each of the speakers' theories. The speakers: Aristotle and Kant. The song: Pixie, written and performed by Ani DiFranco.

M E D I A T O R :

Today we are joined by two great philosophers, Aristotle and Immanuel Kant. Welcome to our forum, gentlemen. You have graciously agreed to participate in an open discussion and interpretation of a contemporary song, Pixie, by singer / songwriter Ani DiFranco. We will list the lyrics by section and you can each voice your opinions and theories. If you so desire, you can also respond to each other's interpretations. We hope to facilitate a discussion distinguishing your epistemological differences and applying your ethical theories to the thoughts, experiences, and actions expressed in the song. This is an open discussion, but please allow each other to speak without interruptions. Well, shall we begin?

*i'm a pixie
 i'm a paper doll
 i'm a cartoon
 i'm a chipper cheerful free for all
 and i light up a room
 i'm the color me happy girl
 miss live and let live
 and when they're out for blood
 i always give*

A R I S T O T L E :

I have a teleological view of a flourishing life that rests within a biological framework, which is a theory based on a natural end of happiness. The mind and the object or agent being observed must be consistent in order to accurately bring sensory and intellectual perceptions into one's consciousness. One can observe an agent's capacities, or notable traits, which contribute to the natural end of that particular agent. In this opening, DiFranco identifies her personal activities, or traits, that contribute to her final cause, or end. She seems to focus on elating others, which would suggest that her final cause is to promote happiness. I would also like to note that the last two lines show how DiFranco is willing to compromise in certain situations so that she can maintain order in her life to reach the desired end of happiness. By acting toward this final cause, DiFranco can truly flourish by achieving the ultimate end of humans, which is happiness.

K A N T :

Such a biological framework does not seem to do justice when discussing the importance of an agent's self-consciousness. According to my theories, self-consciousness, expressed by the agent as "I," is embedded in organizing one's actions or experiences in a process that I termed "synthesis." The unity of an agent while processing data in a rule-governed manner to organize sensory data into concepts exhibits a "synthetic unity of perceptions." An agent, therefore has an objective a priori validity resting on "the relation in which our entire sensibility, and with it all possible appearances, stand to original apperception," or as long as the agent is constantly aware of self-consciousness.¹ Basically, the agent imposes awareness of self-identity on perceived data as it is configured, so how something looks to an agent is merely a reflection of the subject ("I") that organized it.

A R I S T O T L E :

I, too, have postulated that imagination "involves a synthesis of concepts"² and that the thinking soul discriminates with a type of unity that acts as a connector of faculties, linking the mind's images to the perceived objects.³ Thus, "the mind which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks."⁴ This is why it is so important to have consistency between the mind and the object or agent being observed.

*the man behind the counter
 looks like he's got
 a half a dozen places he'd rather be
 and furthermore*

*it looks like he's prepared
to take it all out
on me*

K A N T :

Here, DiFranco phrases her experience with the man behind the counter beautifully. She twice says “looks like,” which is actually how one should view the world. I realize that your theoretical framework is based on how things *are*, with the mind acting as a camera as it sketches out what it sees, but actually how things *look* to the viewer is what I have concluded to be the source of necessity. She accepts the temporal input of the scene in that he first looks like he doesn't want to be there, and then that he is going to somehow affect her life because of his troubles. This contradicts your previous statement that DiFranco is willing to compromise herself “when they're out for blood.” However, her awareness through the time span of the event supports my theory of knowledge that self-consciousness orders data and, thus, how things look to an agent is the source of necessity.⁵

A R I S T O T L E :

I realize that you think that something inside the agent's mind is the source for necessity, but I have stated that the source of necessity is the observed object's or agent's essence. Humans are different from other animals because we have knowledge and understanding, and we also have the ability to develop insight. Our intellectual consciousness is connected to essence through a quantum leap of control from image to concept, or “induction.”⁶

K A N T :

The non-sequitur style of your theory of induction is atrocious. It does not logically flow because nothing outside the mind can correspond to a mental state. The natural act of the mind is to think that there *is* something outside the mind that corresponds to the “useful fiction” that the mind creates in order to perform functions. Your suggestion of induction is itself a quantum leap that is invalid. Basically, you are theorizing that the mind takes an active role in controlling the human and, therefore, makes the man himself passive to the event. Furthermore, you constantly speculate that ends are achievable to those who are merely active participants in deliberation and other “virtuous” qualities. At no point do you actually detail how one should deliberate or even what occurs during this deliberation. I have dedicated a great deal of work to just this task.

A R I S T O T L E :

Actually, you are misinterpreting me if you think that I differentiate the mind and the man, for the mind is actually the identity of the man. Had you really studied my works you would realize that man is the only agent who has the ability to actively use insight, which allows induction to be of use to him, and induction is merely a piece of the reasoning process with which he is equipped. This voice of self-consciousness is man's faculty of reason, and, if it is used as one's natural ruler and guide in contemplation, it leads to a morality based in one's loyalty to one's self.⁷ Induction is, therefore, man taking an active role in favoring reason and rationality in controlling himself.

K A N T :

But I must reiterate, induction is invalid because one cannot use mere sensory perceptions to recognize an agent's natural end. Your teleological epistemology focuses on supposed natural ends . . .

A R I S T O T L E :

First of all, according to my theory of knowledge, every agent has (1) matter, or description, detailed to that one specific thing and (2) essence, or definition, which is how the matter is organized. Every agent also has observable capacities which lead toward a final cause. This teleological end allows us to judge an agent's activities as right or wrong based on whether the actions are appropriate compared to this natural purpose. In my attempt to ascertain the function of man, I concluded that man alone has "an active life of the element that has a rational principle."⁸ Secondly, I would like to point out that your theoretical framework is also teleological.

K A N T :

Yes, some of my theories can be viewed as teleological in that they are based on ends, but my arguments have a stronger foundation because, unlike your study of the good that can be produced by focusing on how agents function in a "virtuous" pursuit of the seemingly unattainable "good life," my studies are based on the ends that are achievable since they are set forth by reason,⁹ not on the stance that man can intuit an agent's nature. My theories focus more on how to achieve an end that could become a universal imperative by presenting a structure to follow in deliberations. You just assume that man desires good, while I

actually separate the imperatives that drive desire into those which are conditional and those which are categorical. I present an internal view while your theories are based "outside" the mind. Your perception-based intuition prejudices the reason being used. "Outside" forces and events cannot be used to objectively deliberate and gauge universal reasonableness, especially regarding how you postulate your induction theory. How can you build a theoretical foundation on such variable observations? You have even written, "Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception."¹⁰

A R I S T O T L E :

I did write that, but you are misusing the statement to imply a lack of foundation for intuition. The idea which I referenced in that particular quote is that sentient perception is a quality that we share with many other animals. However, only man has the ability to ask why something happens. Humans are rational and intelligent and, therefore, have the capacity of induction. One can conclude that induction is a categorical truth that can be established about human beings. Of the ways humans perceive truth, "scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge [because intuition is] the originative source of scientific knowledge."¹¹ This is a key factor in my epistemology based on a hierarchical stratification of agents with consciousness.¹² Furthermore, in defense of my theoretical foundation, I have stated that "variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason."¹³

K A N T :

But it's wrong! You *cannot* categorically establish breakthroughs as major functions in acquiring knowledge! Yes, there may be some things people can understand after deliberation and reach a point of understanding, then even have a quantum leap in the apparent form of induction. However, it is insane to think that people's general observations on a daily basis are all founded in perception-based interpretations that claim the form of insight!

A R I S T O T L E :

It "looks like" you're getting a little hot under the collar. Why don't you just separate yourself from your emotions by respecting reasonableness or something? It's not so easy in the real world when it's more than just words on paper, is it, universality boy?!

M E D I A T O R :

Okay, gentlemen, let's take a little time out. It is obvious that there is a rift between your respective views, especially based on your distinctive epistemologies and the extreme differences in how exactly knowledge is acquired. However, you have been mentioning a number of issues on which you could attempt to elaborate throughout your discussion here in a more objective manner. Let's move on to the next section, please.

buddy,

I don't really care what your problem is just don't make it

mine

A R I S T O T L E :

Here, DiFranco demonstrates great insight in her phrasing of an important idea. With regard to the correct time to end interpersonal relationships, I include the moral deterioration of one of the parties involved, for only good can be loved.¹⁴ In the true nature of friendship, such a relationship is based on a certain resemblance,¹⁵ but unequals will equalize.¹⁶ In this section, DiFranco foresees the potential equalization of his attitude on her, so she seems to attempt to prevent such an occurrence by choosing to distance herself from becoming involved in his situation.

K A N T :

I think that you are basically saying that one person's emotions can influence another's, and if that is the case, DiFranco realizes the need to preserve her balanced self-regard. Perhaps she knows that she doesn't want any emotional influences that this man may unload on her, so she wants to avoid an interpersonal exchange with him. I have stated that, while deliberating, one experiences a battle between (1) the feeling caused by insight, or respect for the primacy of reason, and (2) the pathological threats to freedom, which take the form of feelings or interests.¹⁷

*come on kids,
let's all hold hands
and pretend we're having a good time*

A R I S T O T L E :

Well, DiFranco suggests here, perhaps metaphorically, that we should maintain a level of civility in the face of disagreement by stating that we should “all hold hands.” In *The Politics*, I address the power of speech for man. Our natural tendency toward forming political communities is connected to our use of public discourse.

K A N T :

No civil obligation can require someone to act or behave in a certain way with a certain motive. Ethical theory is concerned with internal motivations, but political theory is concerned with maintaining public freedom. Civil society itself is an ordered pattern of force in the interest of preserving freedom,¹⁸ where rule-enforced order constrains the freedom of citizens to such a universal and agreed upon degree that it ultimately becomes a preservation of freedom.

A R I S T O T L E :

Perhaps, but being civil is a deliberate effort to maintain a level of discourse to preserve peace and public order while living with people who don't necessarily agree.¹⁹

K A N T :

Okay, that is more of a political argument, but in response to your opening ethical standpoint on this excerpt, I argue that one must use social interactions to “cultivate a disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect – and so associate the [social] graces with virtue. To bring this about is itself a duty of virtue.”²⁰ So, as you have said, by DiFranco's deliber-

ate effort to preserve peace, she is also promoting a “virtuous disposition by at least making virtue fashionable.”²¹

*maybe you don't like your job
maybe you didn't get enough sleep
well, nobody likes their job
nobody got enough sleep
maybe you just had
the worst day of your life
but, you know, there's no escape
and there's no excuse*

A R I S T O T L E :

DiFranco seems quite understanding in this potential inference. Although I define understanding as “applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned – and judging soundly,”²² I think that this statement is applicable to the situation because she is judging someone's possible situations leading to a change in behavior. It actually sounds as if she is acting as a sympathetic judge. I have written that “sympathetic judgment is judgment which discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly.”²³ Thus, this attitude is necessary for interpersonal relationships because one must objectively position one's self to sympathize before making a judgment.

K A N T :

I see what you are saying. In different terminology, I have a somewhat similar view that humanity is a conditional duty in that humans are naturally receptive to

sharing others' feelings. However, I have broken humanity down into two distinct branches: sympathy and compassion.²⁴ One has an obligation to sympathy because it is free and freedom is found in making moral decisions based on insight and rationality. In a moral duty such as this, it is a necessity to be reasonable out of pure respect for the awe and importance of reasonableness. Meeting this requirement, therefore, provides moral worth.²⁵ However, the last two lines of this section support my theories that one cannot make a moral decision on a pathological basis. The extent to which behavior is caused by influences, such as those with which DiFranco has sympathized, acts against and diminishes freedom.²⁶

M E D I A T O R :

With that thought, I think that you can easily transition to the next line.

K A N T :

As always, I remain your most humble and obedient servant.

*so just suck up
and be nice*

K A N T :

Here, DiFranco is exercising a decision-making process toward the categorical imperative.²⁷ Essentially, she is actively making a decision to not react emotionally to the situation and, in fact, deciding to act in a manner that allows her to be justified in a universal moral law. This statement

expresses a moral consciousness that I set forth as, "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law."²⁸ She is basically stating that no matter what you may be feeling at a given moment, realize that you can actively make the decision to autonomously be nice.

A R I S T O T L E :

I would like to emphasize your phrasing when you described her decision-making as taking an active role. As you know, I strongly believe in the achievability of goals through action. In this particular case, I think that DiFranco is applying practical wisdom and moral virtue²⁹ to declare her conclusion that people should be nice.

*all the privileged white kids on tv
playing at death
brandishing their cold cuts
with their ghostly makeup
and their heroine breath
and all the fishes are flapping wildly
on their hooks
while all the top critics find great meaning
in the telephone book*

A R I S T O T L E :

These descriptions really seem to demonstrate DiFranco's disapproving feelings toward self-indulgence, for they are linked to the senses and, in the custom to become affiliated with self-indulgence, these actions approach us "not as men but as animals."³⁰

DiFranco even alludes to this fact by referring to some of these people as “fishes.” Self-indulgence is characterized by an excessive craving of pleasures and one who is “led by his appetite to choose at the cost of everything else.”³¹ After all, the voluntary practice of activities gradually, but unavoidably, produces certain character traits,³² of which I have written, “we are masters of our actions . . . but though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious . . . [but] the states are voluntary.”³³ Once a man becomes self-indulgent through voluntary actions, it is not possible to simply change because his character has been altered.³⁴ To provide a contrasting view, a temperate man “occupies a middle position” regarding such pleasures, while a self-indulgent man “loves such pleasures more than they are worth.”³⁵

K A N T :

I agree that one cannot decide to change such behavior once one’s character has been altered because one has established a habitual inclination.³⁶ I attempt to demonstrate, through a catechism, the instruction on the proper basis for the command of duty. To show how to observe an obligation, I have written that it is “the shamefulfulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent himself) that must be emphasized above all.”³⁷

*the little emperor he has no clothes
so he can't come out to play
and besides which
life is suffering
and he likes it that way*

A R I S T O T L E :

DiFranco’s phrasing of his inability to “come out and play” is very interesting. This is almost exactly from my text differentiating the good man and the evil man, which states that “those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy themselves.”³⁸ The evil man experiences an annihilation of reason, which is inherently self-destructive, for there is no peace of mind for him as he is torn by being pulled in many directions.³⁹

K A N T :

Even though I do not go so far as to state that an agent becomes inherently self-destructive, I also believe that there must be, in the relationship between happiness and morality, a proportionate connection between the two,⁴⁰ for the mind balks if there is an incongruity between them.

A R I S T O T L E :

If we are going to get into morality here, I must state that the ultimate motive for being good is the possibility of friendship.⁴¹

K A N T :

But pure friendship is only an ideal.

M E D I A T O R :

You can both specifically address friendship in the upcoming section.

*and the little guy is not so friendly
but you know life has been*

cruel

A R I S T O T L E :

Like I was just saying, the ultimate motive for being good is the possibility of friendship, including with one's self, which is essential to man and achievable by action. In this case, "the little guy is not so friendly," perhaps as a reflection of what his life has become through his aforementioned annihilation of reason.

K A N T :

Regardless of the state of his life, friendship is an ideal that should be kept as an ideal. It is simply not realistic. We do have a "duty of friendship" which involves respect for the necessary ideal, while realizing that perfect friendship is not achievable in practice.⁴²

A R I S T O T L E :

How can you say that? Friendship is necessary for men! I discuss three issues that contribute to why man needs friends,⁴³ most importantly to provide reflective selves by which one can view one's self through those close to him. We are generally too close to ourselves to make objective judgments.

K A N T :

No, it is impossible to achieve perfect friendship for two distinct reasons. First, we can never know what is truly in someone else's head, so there is an epistemological

block on achieving friendship. Second, every human friendship is a state of tension between two undeniable forces, those of attraction to others and repulsion from the prospect of the resulting compromised self-respect and self-possession, or autonomy, so we must keep others at a distance.

A R I S T O T L E :

These claims create a good cautionary note, but the theory behind them is wrong. First of all, since friendship is based on a unity of common insight, we can have personal knowledge of others. I have postulated that a friend is a reflection of one's self, which creates a mirrored identity. Secondly, in the process of creating "our" friendship, "we" forms as a counterpart to one's "I." Each party of "we" has a clearer consciousness than "I" because the agents have reflective alter-egos.

K A N T :

But familiarity breeds contempt! If people get too close, respect can be forever lost!⁴⁴

M E D I A T O R :

I think that we are at a theoretical impasse here, gentlemen. Would you like to continue on to the next two lines?

so wipe that smile off your face baby

*and try to
be cool*

K A N T :

The categorical imperative, represented by DiFranco's suggestion to "try to be cool," answers problems brought about by my theory that decisions cannot be made with emotional influences. Essentially, one can off-set emotions by introducing another in opposition, specifically that of respect. The only possible object with a feeling of respect is rationality. Humans are agents of respect because they are autonomous and act on intelligence. Reason itself sets certain goals that have a decisive role in the decision-making process without posing any threat to freedom or autonomy. A respect to be reasonable presents self-control of the mind over emotions, and lays the foundation for my notion of true autonomy, consciously allowing the mind to control or restrain personal freedom. There is a fundamental role for feelings, but they are kept in their proper place by respect so reason is not defenseless against those forces.⁴⁵ Moral law has the power to generate respect in order to support insight and integrity.⁴⁶

A R I S T O T L E :

Moral virtue is not the power to suppress one's feelings as your description of alienating or counteracting emotions seems to suggest. It is, in fact, humanizing them in order to make them contextually appropriate and balanced so that they gain significance.

*maybe you don't like your job
maybe you didn't get enough sleep
well, nobody likes their job
nobody got enough sleep
maybe you just had*

*the worst day of your life
but, you know, there's no escape
and there's no excuse
so just suck up
and be nice*

A R I S T O T L E :

All these potential pathological states that DiFranco presents are reasons, which are pieces of objectivity that show mind in touch with reality, thus DiFranco is trying to be objective and maintain the characteristic of "clarity." By being loyal to one's self and arranging everything in one's life so that it is focused in the mind, one has integrity and can achieve the "good life," or happiness. Nature gives everyone a clear mind, but we can get clouded by decisions we make that cause a change in mentality resulting from walking away from the voice of reason. As a result of blinding one's insight, one has no internal resource for restoring that clarity of mind, which is reflected by DiFranco's statement that "there's no escape." For these reasons, maintaining control and practical wisdom is an absolute necessity. Intense emotions can fixate the mind and put a piece out of place, in which case, one loses control.⁴⁷

K A N T :

Such a loss of control would be destructive, but not for your reason of losing happiness. The most important driving concept that would be lost is freedom. If something influences or disrupts the decision-making process, the resulting rift in unity and alien-

ation within one's self will lead to a loss of freedom, for moral law and freedom reciprocally imply one another.⁴⁸ This particular situation noted by DiFranco is an example of heteronomy, a condition in which the decision-making process is under the influence of something. Such a breakdown of the decision-making process due to a seemingly absolute fixation of emotions contains diminished responsibility⁴⁹ because the mind always has the ideal of the absolute and, in the absence of the awe of self-respect, an influential feeling can take on the guise of an absolute and fixate the mind.

*yeah, i would like to perfect the art
of being studiously aloof
like life is just a boring chore
and i am living proof
i could join forces with an army
of ornery hipsters
but then i guess i'd be out of a job
so i guess it's out of the picture*

A R I S T O T L E :

DiFranco is obviously aware that she has limitations, not necessarily imposed on her, but from her need to not give into desires that are more than moderate, because beyond self-sufficiency is a distraction. DiFranco is aware that she should not engage herself in the pursuit of things that she does not need, "for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess . . . for the life of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy."⁵⁰ One can reach the "good life" by orchestrating all human needs in an orderly way. DiFranco objectively realizes that "it's out of the picture," and is, therefore, exercising and cultivating

reason, which contributes to the best state of mind.⁵¹

K A N T :

Finally! You admit the importance of taking note of reason! One must maintain a respect for reason when making decisions, especially as important and life-changing as the one DiFranco is describing.

A R I S T O T L E :

Well, when I discuss practical reason, I postulate that character, not a concept, is the root of judgments, and that self-control in the form of temperance provides discipline which then protects good judgment.⁵² Acting on reason is a form of control, so DiFranco is free in the sense that she is acting on a deliberate insight and being true to herself.⁵³ Can we move on to the last section to continue my thought?

K A N T :

I have no objection to that.

M E D I A T O R :

Okay, then. Let's move to the end of the song. Since this is the last section, perhaps you can each give us a "big picture" idea of your understanding of the basis of morality in ethics.

*i'm a pixie
i'm a paper doll
i'm a cartoon*

*i'm a chipper cheerful free for all
and i light up a room
i'm the color me happy girl
miss live and let live
and when they're out for blood
i always give*

A R I S T O T L E :

Well, I just wanted to continue my thoughts with this final section that revisits DiFranco's self-identification. The only difference here is the word "cuz" in the beginning. I think that this represents her attitude that she knows who she is and that she is not going to change for anyone else. This is very important because being loyal to one's self, which is integrity, leads to happiness.⁵⁴ I, therefore, postulate that the basis of morality in ethics is ourselves and that the mind delights in itself when it acts. Thus, morality and happiness are related to one's relationship with one's self and the activity of contemplation to be loyal to one's self.⁵⁵

K A N T :

Humans are obviously the basis of morality, and happiness is involved in one's integrity, but it is not the reason why. Humans are ends within themselves and have dignity, and they maintain a self-legislative and autonomous rule of restraint. Moral consciousness, which drives reason, is identical to absolute freedom. However, we must remember that morality is not a cause in the physical world, but we do have a duty to maintain our autonomy and seek happiness. I think that the ideal, as you might say, Aristotle, is to try to have a "good life."

M E D I A T O R :

While this was supposed to be an objective discussion between two well-respected ethical theorists through the interpretation of a contemporary song, the distinguished and renowned philosophers were, at times, hostile. This should have been predictable, since they do have opposing views at the foundations of their epistemologies, as we saw in the beginning. These differences are then found in every aspect of the ensuing ethics. Thus, we should have assumed that they would take the debate personally, since the discussions were based on their life works and beliefs. In all, I think we at least touched on many issues on which Aristotle and Kant agree and differ. Perhaps this could be the first in a series of more in-depth discussions if more time could be devoted to such magnanimous facets of two outspoken philosophers. Thank you for your attendance and we hope that you enjoyed the discussion.

NOTES

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, 138-139.

² *De Anima*, Bk. III, Ch. 8.

³ *Id.*, Ch. 7.

⁴ *Id.* Emphasis added.

⁵ According to Kant, two important factors are involved in how things look to an agent: (1) the temporally recognizable discreteness of the data input, which creates order by means of one's prevalence in relationship to the object of observation, and (2) that the center of awareness is self-consciousness. The sequence of sensory data input is a rigorously fixed and necessary causal flow to form an objective experience for the agent. This causal sequence does not affect the viewing agent, so something in the agent's consciousness is not in time and is able to make comparisons. Unity is constituted at each moment, represented by the ordered relationship

of many things (perceived data) to one central agent who is aware of the essential self-consciousness. *Critique of Pure Reason*, 138–139.

⁶ Aristotle attempts to thwart potential objectors to his theory of knowledge by explaining how the mind's intellectual consciousness forms a connection to an object's essence. Humans have knowledge when sensory consciousness and matter have the same form. Humans have understanding when intellectual consciousness is doing the same thing as the observed object's essence, which also creates insight. Since humans can think and understand, they are intellectually organized matter and can, therefore, perceive with intelligence. Induction is the point at which the principle of control shifts from imaging to meaning, wherein concepts become mental duplicates of essences.

⁷ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X, Ch. 7.

⁸ Aristotle, in searching for that which is peculiar to man, excludes (1) a life of nutrition and growth, since it is common to even plants, and (2) a life of perception, since it is common to even sentient animals. Humans are intelligent and have the capacity to understand. He thus concludes that man has an active life of rationality. Aristotle explains, "if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle . . . human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue . . . in a complete life." *Id.*, Book I, Ch. 7.

⁹ Kant sets forth two goals, or ethical obligations, required by reason: *one's own perfection and the happiness of others*. First, that humans, out of respect for the ability to set up goals, develop the versatility to achieve these goals. Second, one's regard for humanity and one's self absolutely requires that one consider, at least tacitly, other people when deliberating. *Critique of Practical Reason*, 154–155.

¹⁰ *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 31.

¹¹ *Id.*, Bk. II, Ch. 19.

¹² Aristotle's biological explanation of induction follows a hierarchical pattern: (1) agent is *aware* while contact acts upon it; (2) agent can retain a *trace* of contact after it is over; (3) agent can *systemize* traces, the beginning of memory; (4) agent has capacity to *selectively recall* traces, or memories; (5) agent can set up *comparisons*, thus producing larger classifications and similarities and more general images; and (6) only at the human level, *induction*, a quantum leap of control from image to concept. *Id.* See also, *Metaphysics*, Bk. I, Ch. 1.

¹³ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 11.

¹⁴ *Id.*, Bk. IX, Ch. 3.

¹⁵ *Id.*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 3.

¹⁶ *Id.*, Ch. 8.

¹⁷ *Critique of Practical Reason*, 76–79.

¹⁸ *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 24–25.

¹⁹ *Politics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2.

²⁰ *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 218.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 10. Emphasis added.

²³ *Id.*, Ch. 11.

²⁴ Sympathy is *free* and based on practical reason.

Compassion is *unfree* and spreads among humans in proximity to one another. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 204–205.

²⁵ *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 30.

²⁶ *Critique of Practical Reason*, 28–29.

²⁷ The categorical imperative is how a moral quality enters the decision-making process. According to Kant's practical principle, there are two subsets, maxims and imperatives. Maxims are psychological, subjective bases underlying a decision, which can be pathological or insightful. *Pathological maxims* are feeling-based and can be expressed by "I want." The morality is nullified in such decisions because they always involve the causal influence of something on the agent. *Insightful maxims* are reason-based and can be expressed by "I ought." These are based in morality because reasons are not causal. Thus, when someone makes a decision, it is at the intersection of two fields of force: a *posteriori* incentives (causal, or "I want," factors) and a *priori* principles (insight into what makes sense). The second subset, imperatives, involves an element of "ought" and is contained within some reason. Imperatives can be conditional or categorical. *Conditional imperatives* apply to hypothetical situations for a matter of interest followed by a matter of logic, as can be expressed by an "if . . . then" statement, thus it is insight coupled with an interest. *Categorical imperatives* express an "ought" without a reason, or an "if," and are absolute. Kant's categorical imperative to be reasonable involves three components in making a moral decision: (a) *intelligence* (sense/nonsense): being able to see the difference between making sense and not making sense, or thinking before making a decision in order to weigh one's options; (b) *consciousness of necessity*: the mind cannot be aware of the difference between making sense and not making sense without also being conscious that the final decision ought to make sense, thus the thinking process is driven by the knowledge that decisions ought to make sense; and (c) *moral motive* (respecting the importance of being reasonable and containing a universalizing thought): constructing reasonable justification for certain decisions where reason shows how it is objective and makes sense, which

is crucial in making a moral decision because it holds objectivity and reasonableness.

- ²⁸ The absolute reasonableness of a decision is that it is totally free of any distorting personal interests and is, consequently, completely objective. The formula that captures the justification of a decision to make it universally valid, justifying that freedom should be used in a certain way, is that everyone ought to make the same decision in the same situation. The absence of interest is a negative but reliable measure of objectivity for Kant. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 14.
- ²⁹ Aristotle writes, “the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.” *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 12.
- ³⁰ *Id.*, Bk. III, Ch. 10.
- ³¹ *Id.*, Ch. 11.
- ³² Humans desire a particular end and voluntarily deliberate about and choose actions concerning means, thus the exercise of virtue and vice is in one’s power. Aristotle continues, “Men make themselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent.” *Id.*, Ch. 5. But Aristotle does not claim that self-indulgence *itself* is a voluntary state. He writes, “For the self-indulgent man . . . the particular acts are voluntary (for he does them with craving and desire), but the whole state is less so; for no one craves to be self-indulgent.” *Id.*, Ch. 12.
- ³³ *Id.*, Ch. 5.
- ³⁴ *Id.*
- ³⁵ *Id.*, Ch. 11.
- ³⁶ In a section regarding the manner in which one should attempt to cultivate virtue, Kant explains, “To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination; it is a mechanism of sense rather than a principle of thought (and one that is easier to acquire than to get rid of afterwards.” *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 223.
- ³⁷ *Id.*, 225.
- ³⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. IX, Ch. 4. Emphasis added.
- ³⁹ *Id.*
- ⁴⁰ *Critique of Practical Reason*, 131–132.
- ⁴¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. IX, Ch. 4.
- ⁴² *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 215.
- ⁴³ Aristotle writes, “If (1) happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man’s activity is the virtuous and the pleasant, . . . and (2) a thing’s being one’s own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of

virtuous men who are their friends and pleasant to good men . . . the supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities.” *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. IX, Ch. 9.

⁴⁴ *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 215.

⁴⁵ *Critique of Practical Reason*, 78.

⁴⁶ *Id.*, 79.

⁴⁷ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. III, Ch. 5.

⁴⁸ *Critique of Practical Reason*, 29.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, 33.

⁵⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8.

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*, Bk. VI, Ch. 5.

⁵³ In describing the good man’s relation to himself, Aristotle writes, “his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else . . . he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is.” *Id.*, Bk. IX, Ch. 4.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, Bk. X, Ch. 7.

⁵⁵ *Id.*

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